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The litigation currently arising from the antitrust prosecutions in
the heavy electrical equipment industry1 dramatizes the question
whether corporate shareholders can and should play a more important
role in the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. More specifically,
the problem is whether shareholders' derivative actions 2 are available
as a means of preventing a course of corporate conduct which runs a
serious risk of incurring antitrust penalties or, if the conduct has
already resulted in financial loss to the corporation, of recovering from
the responsible officers and directors. Another aspect of the problem
i Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1946, M.A. 1947, J.D.
1954, University of Chicago. The author is grateful for helpful criticism of parts
of this manuscript by his colleague, Professor William Kenneth Jones.
1 The extent of the civil litigation which has followed the heavy electrical prose-
cutions may be illustrated by reports from law offices and corporate counsel. Thus
one of the larger electrical firms reports that almost 150 complaints have been
filed against it; and a smaller firm reports approximately fifty complaints by a
total of twenty plaintiffs. A New York law office which has kept records of the
complaints filed against all defendants reports that a total of between 130 and 200
complaints have been filed in the various United States district courts. One possible
explanation for the discrepancy between the figures supplied by individual firms and
those' compiled by this office is that many of the complaints name more than one
party defendant It is probably too early for any shareholders' derivative suits grow-
ing out of the prosecutions to have reached the courts, and the same New York law
office reports that it has not yet discovered any complaints of this nature.
2 "Shareholders' derivative suit' is too ungainly a phrase to repeat on every
occasion when meaning requires reference. "Shareholders' suit!' more suitably de-
scribes an individual or class action pressing claims other than the corporation's.
"Derivative suit," although properly a broader, generic term, presents little risk of
confusion, and will be used here as a slightly more convenient substitute.
(143)
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is whether shareholders can force a reluctant management to avail
itself of such remedies as treble damage suits and injunctions when the
company has suffered or is threatened with antitrust injuries.
Certainly some of the objectionable characteristics of derivative
suits 3 may be accentuated in the antitrust context.4  On the other
hand, both Congress and the courts have repeatedly assigned high
priority to the objectives of the antitrust laws.' Inducements to their
enforcement through private actions have been created which have
few, if any, parallels elsewhere in the legal system. In any event, the
fact is that during the last decade the derivative suit has steadily ex-
tended its importance in the antitrust field. The cases, although as yet
few in number, are plentiful enough to permit analysis of possible
patterns of development.'
3 To a great many lawyers, this class of suit is an anathema, in part because the
nature of the action lends itself readily to the abuses sufficiently summed up in the
term "strike suit!'; in part also, perhaps, because even when legitimately used, deriva-
tive suits represent an intrusion into what management usually regards as its exclusive
domain of decision and policymaking-a domain into which outsiders, even those to
whom ultimate responsibility lies, are admitted only very unwillingly. See, e.g.,
WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DFRIVATIVE SuiTs (1944);
Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits, 37 Cs.LIF. L. REv. 399 (1949).
4 See, e.g., p. 156 infra.
5 The rhetorical heights to which the merits of competition in general and the
antitrust laws in particular often inspire legislators and courts need hardly be cited
to chapter and verse. More persuasive are the statements found in ATr'y GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 1-3, 317-18, 378-85 (1955).
6 We are here concerned only with shareholders' derivative suits. Apparently
the nature of an antitrust injury is such that a shareholder cannot successfully show
the special injury required to establish standing to sue individually or representa-
tively for shareholders as a class. See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704
(3d Cir. 1910). See also Comment, 5 STAN. L. REv. 480, 481-84 (1953).
A derivative suit gives rise to two independent judicial inquiries. Before the
substantive cause of action may be decided on its merits, the court must find that
the failure of the directors to press the corporation's claim for relief is indefensible.
In the cases tp- be discussed, the subst, tive cause of action is either an alleged
violation of thP-federal antitrust laws, kbreach of the directors' duty to the cor-
poration, or both. Thus a director who participates in an antitrust violation which
injures his corporation may face liability on three analytically separate bases: (1) for
violation of statutory law which provides for penalty damages to any injured person,
including the complaining corporation; (2) for breach of his common-law duty to
the corporation not to injure it through faithless acts; and (3) for breach of his
common-law duty to the corporation to seek appropriate legal relief-including relief
from acts in which he himself may have participated. In practice, the distinction
between the first and second bases has been made primarily for purposes of considera-
tion of jurisdiction, that is, whether a state court entertain a shareholders' derivative
suit in which a federal antitrust violation is involved. See pp. 146-47 infra. By
itself, the third basis seldom, if ever, supports liability, perhaps because the dam-
ages hurdle is even more difficult than showing a breach of duty. However, recov-
ery on this basis is not inconceivable in, say, a case in which an open-and-shut
treble damages action against outsiders has fraudulently or negligently been allowed
to become barred by a statute of limitations. In fact, the penalty normally imposed
for breach of the duty to bring suit is that the decision and control of the suit are taken
out of the hands of management and given to the complaining shareholders. For a
more complete discussion of these matters, see LATrIn, CoRroRAIoNs 349-52 (1959);
Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 342 (1952).
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I. ACTIONS To ENFORCE THE COMPANY'S ANTITRUST REMEDIES
The first type of case to be considered is that in which a share-
holder alleges that an injury has been or is being visited upon his cor-
poration, and that the injury stems from a violation of the antitrust
laws. The essential feature is that, although the corporation itself is
not being made to violate the antitrust laws, it is not defending itself
against, or seeking reparations for, injury at the hands of those who
are. This forebearance is usually motivated by some implication of
the controlling directors or shareholders in the activities of the prospec-
tive defendant. In a much smaller number of cases, the antitrust claim
is not pressed because the directors or shareholders, though not im-
plicated, have made a decision against doing so which the complaining
shareholder believes to be capricious.
A. Procedural Obstacles
Where the remedy sought by the shareholder in this type of suit
was treble damages, for thirty-five years prior to 1953 he found him-
self automatically out of court. In Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Light-
ing Co., 7 a shareholder alleged that defendants had conspired in viola-
tion of the antitrust laws to acquire control of the corporation and
destroy it as a competitor, and had done so. The injury having been
completed, treble damages was the appropriate remedy. But the
Supreme Court held that the claim could not be made.8 A share-
holders' derivative suit is an equitable form of action; to permit it in
a suit for damages would destroy defendant's right to a jury trial on
that issue, a result which Mr. Justice Holmes said the Sherman Act
did not seek to bring about
Shortly thereafter, in United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co.,' the Court affirmed a Second Circuit decision, on facts that
are not well reported, that no derivative action would lie without allega-
tions of both a breach of trust by the directors or control of the di-
rectors by the defendants and a demand on the shareholders." In
addition, Mr. Justice Brandeis noted that even if these requisites had
been satisfied, a shareholder's derivative suit, being a purely equitable
remedy, could not be brought at law.' 2
7240 U.S. 27 (1916).
8 Id. at 29.
0 Ibid.
10 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
11 Id. at 263-64. On this point the decision is still today a leading one. See
Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1957).
12244 U.S. at 264.
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There being no other alternatives, federal courts could not enter-
tain derivative antitrust suits in which a claim for damages was made.
Although Holmes' logic did not exclude the possibility of equitable
remedies, the applicable provision of the Sherman Act 3 was inter-
preted to limit to the federal government the right to sue for injunc-
tive relief.14 After 1914, however, section 16 of the Clayton Act' 5
broadened the availability of injunctions. Although this provision was
narrowly construed as applied to a shareholder seeking to enjoin the
allegedly illegal actions of his own corporation, 6 apparently, it has
always been available to a shareholder suing derivatively in a federal
court to obtain relief for an injury emanating outside the corpora-
tionY The shareholder was not, however, able to obtain damages-
even untrebled-as an incidental remedy in a suit for an injunction.' s
But the hybrid nature of derivative antitrust suits means that the
statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts is not the only basis on
which such facts may be brought before a court. So far as traditional
doctrines are concerned, state courts can entertain derivative suits for
breach of the common-law duty of a director to his corporation based
on facts which might incidentally constitute an antitrust violation. 9
If an injunction is sought, however, it may prove fatal to make specific
antitrust allegations, for the Supreme Court early held that section 16
provided an exclusive remedy and foreclosed state action.20  But even
an antitrust allegation, although perhaps in some sense improper, 21 does
not necessarily defeat the jurisdiction of a state court to consider a
claim for ordinary damages or equitable remedies other than an in-
1326 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
14 Minnesota v. Northern See. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904); Corey v. Inde-
pendent Ice Co., 207 Fed. 459 (D. Mass. 1913).
'L538 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958): "Any person, firm, corporation,
or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of
the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . .. ."
16 See Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. Ry., 16 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir.
1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927). See also Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry.,
84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936); General Inv. Co. v. New
York Cent. R.R., 23 F.2d 822 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 588 (1928).
1 See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 286-87
(1922). See also General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 228 (1926);
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
18 Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1928).
19 Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); see pp.
166-67 infra. See also General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 260 U.S.
261 (1922); Venner v. New York Cent & H.R.R., 177 App. Div. 296, 164 N.Y.
Supp. 626, aff'd, 226 N.Y. 583, 123 N.E. 893 (1919); Comment, 59 MicH. L. Rxv.
904, 921-27 (1961).
20 General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., supra note 19.
21 See Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 157-58, 51 N.E.2d 681, 688-89 (1943).
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junction.2 Where jurisdiction is well founded, no reason appears why
a state court might not treat an adjudication that defendant directors
had 'participated in an antitrust violation which injured their cor-
poration as a conclusive or prima facie demonstration of a breach of
common-law duty.3 ' And even in the absence of a prior determina-
tion in a federal court, there is no compelling reason why a state court
should not look to the federal antitrust statutes and cases to give
specific content to the common-law duty, although this would seldom
seem necessary or useful 4 Nonetheless, for a period of some thirty-
five years after the Fleitmann decision, derivative suits in the antitrust
context, except for the railroad merger suits,25 were virtually non-
existent." The unavailability of treble damages, the uncertain scope
of injunctive relief in federal courts, and jurisdictional uncertainties
27
combined to produce discouragement.
B. Effect of the Federal Rules
In 1953 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Fanchon
& Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,"' reconsidered the effect of the
Fleitmann case in the light of the intervening adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaining shareholder, Fanchon &
Marco, had joined with defendant Paramount Pictures to form the
corporation on whose behalf suit was brought, for the purpose of ex-
ploiting a lease on a movie theatre. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's
course of conduct, adjudged in violation of the antitrust laws in the
Paramount Pictures case,29 had caused it loss of profits. The district
22 Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry., 55 F.2d 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Guiterman v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136,
73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
2 3 That a violation of statute need not necessarily constitute a breach of duty to
shareholders see discussion at pp. 161, 169 infra.
24 See Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931) ; Underhill
v. Schenck, 238 N.Y. 7, 143 N.E. 773 (1924). It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to
conceive of a situation in which the standard of good faith and care which a director
acting in his own interest owes to his corporation would demand less than the general
standard of conduct required by the antitrust laws.
25 See cases cited notes 16 and 17 supra.
26 See Comment, supra note 6, at 483-84, 489-90.
27 Compare Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931), in
which a federal district court took a liberal view of state court jurisdiction to support
its own jurisdiction on removal, in spite of General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. So.
Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922), with Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 51 N.E.2d 681
(1943), in which, even at a much later date, the New York Court of Appeals took a
quite different position. Federal courts also played the jurisdictional shell game, for
example, by denying jurisdiction to consider a derivative suit for an accounting and
injunction, alleging Sherman Act violations, on the grounds that what was involved
was a breach of fiduciary duty and no substantial federal question. Meyer v. Kansas
City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1936) ; see note 45 infra.
28202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
2
9 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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court, following Fleitmann, dismissed the complaint,30 saying of the
federal rules that their provision for a single form of action had not
changed "the basic difference between law and equity. . .. " " On
appeal the decision was reversed, Judge Clark's opinion reasonint that
the right of a defendant to a jury trial on the treble damages issue-the
basic point of the Fleitmann analysis-could now be preserved under
the more flexible procedures of the new rules; indeed, the lower court's
result could only be upheld on the basis that the federal courts were
entirely without power to deal with suits of this type, for "the one civil
action under the rules is used to vindicate any civil power the district
court has," 32 the demand for judgment forming no part of the claim
for relief. Reviewing the policy grounds set forth by the Supreme
Court in Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,3 the court found no
reason why the derivative form of action should not be available in
treble damage cases.
Although Fanchon & Marco eliminated the conceptual obstacle to
derivative treble damage suits, it did not provide answers to other
problems arising from the hybrid common-law and statutory bases for
the action. Because there has been to date no explicit judicial consid-
eration of these problems, the assumption must be made that the usual
doctrines with respect to demand on the board of directors and stock--
holders, the "business judgment" standard, and the like, are to be
applied, as well as such state statutory provisions as those providing
for "security for costs" to the corporation. 4  However, discussion of
one group of important doctrinal questions will serve as an example
of the special considerations which are involved in such suits.
C. Business Judgment Defense
To protect management against unwarranted harassment and
intermeddling in normal corporate affairs, the complaining share-
holder must show that he has made a sufficient demand on the directors
that the action be brought and the company, a nominal defendant in
a derivative action, is permitted to defeat the suit at the outset by
showing that the decision not to press the company's claim was a
reasonable exercise of business judgment by an independent majority
of the directors.3 5 To make the business judgment defense, evidence
3 0 Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
31 Id. at 541.
32 202 F.2d at 734.
33 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947).
34 See generally STEvENs, CORPORATIONS §§ 169-74 (2d ed. 1949).
3 See generally Note, Dentand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite
to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARv. L. REv. 746 (1960).
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may be introduced by management on such questions as the likelihood
of success in the proposed litigation, direct and indirect costs of pro-
ceeding with it, the probable limits of recovery, and the possibility of
difficulty to the company arising from impairment of friendly business
relations with the defendants or in the industry generally. When the
defendant is an important supplier or customer the last factor may be
of decisive importance. But even when the defendant is a competitor, a
general distaste to become an antitrust plaintiff may weigh heavily in
management's decision. In an ordinary commercial case, it seems
reasonable that this consideration be given considerable weight in
evaluating the directors' decision. However, it is open to serious
question whether Congress' policy of encouraging antitrust enforcement
through private suits should be defeated by giving weight to manage-
ment reluctance to upset perhaps overly amicable relationships within
the industry.
The statutory source of the claim provides additional complica-
tions with respect to directors' suitable exercise of judgment. The fact
that damages proven by the company will be trebled must certainly enter
into the decigion as to whether suit should be brought. The fact that
the offender's conduct is the subject of a government-litigated judg-
ment or decree and the company thus has the benefit of the prima facie
rule of section 5 of the Clayton Act,"0 would clearly be relevant. On
the other hand, where section 5 does not apply and the alleged offense
is not per se illegal, but subject to the vagaries of a "rule of reason,"
it is difficult to imagine that an independent business judgment not to
litigate could ever be successfully challenged.
1. Lack of Disinterested Directors
If the reported cases are a basis for judgment, however, there
will usually not be an uninvolved board to make an independent judg-
ment about bringing suit. Whether or not this is because an inde-
pendent management is usually eager to press antitrust claims, almost
all derivative suits of the type here under discussion have involved a
charge that controlling directors or shareholders have diverted profits
to another company. In this situation-where a disinterested major-
ity of directors is not available-the usual rule is that no demand need
be made, because it would be futile."' However, the shareholder may
be required to make such a demand at a shareholders' meeting if the
wrong alleged is one that can be "ratified" and if a majority of share-
holders are not involved in the offense. However, there is considerable
3669 Stat 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
37 SwT Ns, ColoRApoNs § 169 (2d ed. 1949).
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authority,38 some recent and well considered,"O that even a clear dis-
interested majority of the shareholders cannot ratify injurious manage-
ment conduct which is illegal under the antitrust laws. In Rogers v.
American Can Co.,4" Rogers, a shareholder in Metal & Thermit
Corporation, which was engaged in the detinning and sale of tin plate
scrap, alleged that a majority of its directors, in conspiracy with
American Can Company, owner of 20%o of the shares, had caused the
company to purchase tin plate scrap from American Can at higher than
competitive prices. Acting on Rogers' demand that injunctive relief
and treble damages be sought, an independent majority of shares were
voted against the proposal. Denying defendants' motion to dismiss
and for summary judgment, the court based its decision squarely on
the undesirability of permitting a majority of shareholders to bar a
derivative suit seeking relief against directors' and shareholders' acts
allegedly violating the antitrust laws. The court distinguished be-
tween conduct solely "ultra vires the corporation" and violation of
"positive law," especially "laws [that] express an important nation-
wide public policy." 41 It noted as "aggravating factors" that some
directors and a major shareholder were among the defendants, that the
company was being made to participate "against its will in the con-
spiracy," and that the alleged wrong continued up to the filing of the
complaint and presumably would be continued. This latter factor was
central to the decision.
2. Continuing Offenses
A distinction has often been made in the cases between, on the one
hand, the exercise of business judgment in deciding not to bring suit
even though it is admitted that the acts injurious to the corporation
were illegal or in breach of duty I and, on the other, refusal to bring
38 E.g., Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). But cf.
S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Co., 326 Mass.
99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
39 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Rogers v.
American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 13493, 3d
Cir., Jan. 12, 1961.
40 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960), appeal docketed No. 13493, 3d Cir., Jan.
12, 1961.
41Id. at 538. It should be noted that cases in federal district courts, such as
Rogers, are subject to Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
requires that the complaint "set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff
to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the share-
holders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action
or the reasons for not making such effort." Defendants in Rogers argued that the
decision in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881), codified in Rule 23(b), required
that a negative shareholder vote should bar the derivative action. It is in rejecting
this argument that the Rogers court distinguished the case before it from one like
Hawes involving merely an ultra vires act by directors. See generally 3 Mool ,
FEDERAL PRAcTicE 11123.16, 23.19 (2d ed. 1948).
42 E.g., Kessler v. Ensley Co., 123 Fed. 546 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1903), cert. denied,
205 U.S. 541 (1906); S. Solmont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres
Operating Co., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
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suit as an invalid attempt to ratify an illegal act. Where the offen-
sive acts are continuing, refusal to seek an injunction against directors
seems much more like an attempt to ratify than where the acts have
ended and all that might be sought is damages for past injuries.
This distinction, although somewhat conceptual, seems to provide
a sound basis for further refinement of analysis in cases involving
antitrust allegations. Where the injury is caused by the alleged viola-
tions of outsiders not in control of the company, application of business
judgment criteria will leave the decision whether or not to sue in the
hands of management in all but the most unusual cases. There is no
reason to suppose that management will not usually be alert to the
possibility of recovering treble damages or obtaining equitable relief
against intruders. Thus there is no reason to encourage shareholder
'intervention in such'decisions.44 The question is closer when directors
or influential shareholders are among the alleged offenders, but their
course of conduct has been terminated. On the one hand, the deter-
rent effect of potential treble damage liability is softened if directors,
relatively sure of their control of proxy machinery, know they can
escape shareholder retribution simply by abandoning doubtful conduct
if and when it is called into question. On the other hand, share-
holders' suits can hardly be advocated as the ideal instrument of dis-
passionate antitrust enforcement; perhaps their use is suitably limited
to cases in which management is adamant in its pursuit of questionable
policies. This type of case-in which the company is the victim of
director or shareholder misconduct-always involves a breach of
fiduciary duty. It may be argued, indeed, that it is the breach of duty
which causes injury, regardless of whether antitrust violations exist,
and thus that the federal courts should not open their doors at all in
these cases.f8 But a state court's attitude may be that a refusal to sue
is a business judgment question even where the offense continues. It
seems preferable that federal courts treat the request for injunctive
43 E.g., Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458 (Del. 1958) ; Brewer v. Boston Theater,
104 Mass. 378 (1870); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138
(1912).
44 See Note, supra note 35, at 760, for an elaboration of reasons. This helpful
Note properly emphasizes the distinction between the requirement of demand and
the effect to be given to a refusal. However, this distinction fails to observe that
the concept of ratification is entirely inappropriate where an injury is being inflicted
on a corporation through noncorporate acts, although a decision not to sue may be
defensible. Nor does it note the important difference between terminated injuries,
involving a decision not to sue for damages, and continuing illegality, involving a
decision not to sue for an injunction.
45 Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
607 (1936), seems to be based on this reasoning. The court in Rogers correctly
assumes that this case is effectively narrowed by the rationale of Fanchon & Marco
to a holding on the form of pleadings. Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp.
532, 536 (D.N.J. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 13493, 3d Cir., Jan. 12, 1961.
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relief as controlled by the Clayton Act and deal with the substantive
antitrust question. The Clayton Act's mandate that injunctive relief
be made available to "any person" against "threatened" injury in these
situations should not be defeated through control of proxy machinery,
even though the state rule as to demand and ratification may be fol-
lowed when the only appropriate relief is damages for discontinued
conduct. Note that the suggested treatment eliminates any incentive
to "doctor up" a simple breach of duty case by casting it as an anti-
trust offense with an eye on treble damages and access to a federal
court.
The Rogers case involved continuing conduct; thus its result sup-
ports the foregoing analysis. In addition, however, the court refused
to dismiss the treble damage claim, reasoning that "the wrongs com-
plained of are not separable by periods of time, but are in the form
of a continuing policy." " This result seems entirely salutary. If the
directors refused to terminate the questionable course of conduct, they
should risk treble damage liability for past injury as well as an in-
junction against its continuation.
II. ACTIONS To PREVENT ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS BY THE COMPANY
A second class of derivative antitrust suits is that in which a
shareholder seeks to prevent his company from commencing or con-
tinuing an allegedly illegal course of conduct. The claim is not that
outsiders or controlling directors or shareholders are injuring the
company through their violations of the antitrust laws, but that the
company may be injured by fines or treble damage judgments arising
from conduct in which its management is causing it to engage. Un-
like cases such as Rogers v. American Can Co., there is usually no
breach of directors' duty to the corporation. Their decision that the
corporation shall undertake a course of conduct which the minority
regards as questionable is assumed to be taken in good faith and after
suitable exercise of business judgment.
A. Gomberg v. Midvale Co.
In Gomberg v. Midvale Co.,47 one cause of action in the com-
plaint alleged that the sale of all the assets of Midvale, an iron and
steel producer, would violate the antitrust laws .4  The purchaser was
to be a newly formed corporation, the common stock of which was to
be owned by another iron and steel producer and which was to be in
part financed by three of Midvale's largest customers. In considering
4 6 Rogers v. American Can Co., supra note 45, at 540.
47 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955), appeal dismissed sub norn. Brill v. General
Indus. Enterprises, 234 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1956).
48Id. at 138-42.
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the defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court assumed the truth
of the allegation that injury to Midvale was likely to result from fines
or treble damage judgments, but held that injuries of that kind did
not constitute "threatened harm or damages which proximately flow
from the violations within the meaning of Section 16." 4' This was
because "the injury which the laws envision is the injury to the
economy of the plaintiff, by virtue of restrictions of trade or something
that proximately flows from it, in the competitive field in which it is
engaged when the illegal act is committed." " Midvale's "economy"
would not be injured by the sale of all its assets because it would no
longer be in the iron and steel business. However, the court rejected
defendant's broader argument that injunctive relief could not be given
in a derivative antitrust action, noting that earlier decisions denying the
relief to shareholders were distinguishable as involving representative,
rather than derivative, causes of action. In the court's view, the logic
of Fanchon & Marco, although a suit for damages, controlled in actions
for injunctive relief.
B. Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co.
Because there are indications that the criterion formulated by
Judge Ganey in the Midvale opinion may be followed in other situa-
tions,51 it will be useful to examine its possible application in more
49 Id. at 142.
50 Ibid. In announcing this criterion, the court relied upon Conference of Studio
Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), in which a disgruntled group
of unions and union members was not permitted to invoke the Sherman Act to enjoin
an alleged conspiracy between a rival union and the major motion picture studios.
The allegation that independent studios were injured by the conspiracy seemed pri-
marily for the purpose of making a labor dispute situation into an antitrust case. A
more straightforward decision might have dealt with defendants' claim that what was
involved was an "unfair labor practice" charge within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
The court in Midvale might also have cited the large number of cases denying
standing to sue under the antitrust laws to persons injured in their capacity as creditors,
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704 (3d Cir. 1910), corporate officers, Corey
v. Boston Ice Corp., 207 Fed. 465 (D. Mass. 1913), or landlords, Westmoreland
Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 113
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, 253 F.2d
292 (2d Cir. 1958); Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Cal.
1957). But note that cases involving standing to seek treble damages involve a
different section of the Clayton Act. Section 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1958), provides that a treble damage claimant must show himself "injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. .. ."
Section 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958), provides that an injunction
may be granted on behalf of "any person"e who shows "threatened loss or damages
by a violation of the antitrust laws. .. ." A different policy question is also in-
volved. To allow anyone other than the corporation to pursue damages gives him
an unfair advantage over others who have claims against the corporation. Injunctive
relief alone does not present this kind of problem but, as will be noted below, does
present other difficult ones. See p. 156.
51 See Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), citing
Midvale and adopting its criterion in denying an injunction in a nonderivative suit
by minority directors to prevent'an acquisition on the grounds that it violated § 7 of
the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958) amending 38 Stat.
731 (1914).
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detail and in similar situations recently before the courts. Almost
simultaneously with the Midvale decision the Seventh Circuit was de-
ciding Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co.,5' a case presenting the same
question of law. Neither court apparently was aware of the existence
of the other litigation. The contrasting facts and outcomes are en-
lightening, although the opinion in the Illinois suit is not. Stock-
holders of Domestic Finance Corporation brought the action, ap-
parently derivatively, to restrain the merger of their company into
American Investment Company on the ground that the merger would
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act. The district court's denial of a
temporary injunction was appealed, and defendant's motion to dismiss
the appeal was denied.3 Most of the opinion is devoted to the ques-
tion of mootness raised by the intervening implementation of the
merger,"4 consideration of the substantive issue being limited to quota-
tion from and reliance upon Fanchon & Marco. An important dif-
ference between this case and Midvale is that before the merger
Domestic was under the control of American as a result of the latter's
acquisition of some 80% of the former's outstanding shares and
election of a board of directors composed of its own officers. It was
alleged that the merger was for the benefit of American; thus carrying
it forward would be a breach of the directors' common-law duties. It
was also alleged that the directors had so managed Domestic's affairs
prior to the merger as to reduce its effectiveness as a competitor with
American. Thus Ramsburg is much more like Rogers v. American
Can Co. and the other cases discussed in the preceding section than like
Midvale, because defendants' course of action would have caused the
injury primarily complained of regardless of whether it was illegal
under the antitrust laws. As in Midvale, however, the complaining
corporation would cease to exist and, consistently with Midvale, the
antitrust count-although not necessarily any common-law counts-
would be dismissed. Unfortunately, the opinion's failure of exposition
makes the decision in Ramsburg of little value on these questions.
C. Schechtman v. Wolfson
The Second Circuit has recently dealt with a related problem to
which its approach provides an instructive comparison with that of
Midvale. In Schechtman v. Wolfson,55 a shareholder of Merritt-
52231 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1956).
53 No opinion is reported in the district court. Letters from counsel indicate
that the case was settled shortly after the denial of the motion to dismiss the appeal.
54 On this point, too, the litigation may be contrasted with Midvale in which the
Third Circuit held on appeal that the intervening merger rendered the case moot.
Brill v. General Indus. Enterprises, 234 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1956).
55244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
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Chapman & Scott Corporation, a corporation of which Wolfson and
other defendants were directors, brought a derivative suit to enjoin
them from simultaneously holding directorships in Montgomery Ward
& Co., which was alleged to be in some respects a competitor of the
complaining company. These facts were said to violate the "inter-
locking directorate" provision of section 8 of the Clayton Act. After
the district court refused to dismiss the complaint for failing to state
a cause of action, 6 defendants resigned from the Montgomery Ward
board, and the suit became moot. The lower court's refusal to award
attorney's fees to the complainant was upheld on appeal on the ground
that the suit had conferred no adequate benefit on the corporation.
The opinions both on appeal and below leave little doubt that if the
defendants had not resigned, injunctive relief wouldhave been ap-
propriate on a showing that the statutory criteriaiwere satisfied.
5" It
will be noted that here there was no possibility of direct injury to the
company, because the statute runs only against offending individuals.
5"
This is why no fees were in order. Furthermor6, it cannot be said, in
Judge Ganey's terms, that there was a threat of injury to the "econ-
omy" of the plain-tiff from the interlocking directorates-at least no
injury of a kind different from that of Midvale, which was in effect
being merged into a competitor. Thus Judge Ganey would con-
sistently have granted the motion to dismiss. Possible reasons why
the courts have differed will be suggested in a moment.
D. A Suggested Rationale
Returning to a more general discussion of the criterion suggested
in Midvale, what may constitute an "injury to the economy of the
plaintiff" for which a shareholder may seek relief? Certainly the
acts of competitors, suppliers, or customers, which affect prices or
other condlions in the market and violate the antitrust laws, must be
included.5 9 But can any conduct in which the company itself par-
ticipates-at the instance of its management, of course-injure its own
56 Schechtman v. Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
57 Section 8 provides: "No person at the same time shall be a director in any
two or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits
aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce . . . if
such corporations are or shall have been theretofore . . . competitors, so that the
elimination of competition by agreemenzt between them would constitute a violation of
any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws." 38 Stat. 732 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 19 (1952). (Emphasis added.) Note for the subsequent argument that
the elimination of competition "by agreement' is virtually always a per se offense
under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958);
thus the criteria are very easily shbwn to be satisfied.
58 See note 57 supra.
59 There is, however, authority that a supplier of a directly injured company does
not have standing to sue for treble damages. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe
Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956). Compare note 50 mepra, analyzing
§§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.
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"economy" ? Price-fixing injures the competitive health of the market,
but presumably the company's management, at any rate, believes that
it adds to the plaintiff's economic well-being. This view would seem
to lead to the result that a derivative suit is never available under
section 16 to prevent management from adopting policies involving
antitrust risks.
The problem presented in this class of cases is a difficult one. On
the one extreme, it seems clear that the judicial power should not be
easily invoked by a shareholder or any other private litigant to force
a corporation into a full-scale "big case" economic analysis of any
substantial acquisition or sale of corporate assets or stock, any require-
ments or supply contract, or any franchise system, for example. Not
only to prevent harassment in circumstances under which "strike suits"
might particularly flourish but, equally important, to avoid litigation
of inadequately prepared issues, courts should be reluctant to permit
this kind of issue to be brought to trial by anyone other than the
Government or a private suitor whose very substantial interests are
seriously threatened. On the other hand, it is established doctrine that
a shareholder or minority director has the right to intervene for the
corporation to prevent or terminate its participation in a clearly illegal
act, even though no threat of immediate economic injury to the com-
pany can be shown.6" How much stronger is the argument when he
offers to show that his company is being made to pursue a continuing
course of ille aonduct, which is likely to result in very serious
financial injury through fines or widespread treble damage suits. The
criterion advanced in Midvale is inadequate in that it appears to bar
cases on the wrong basis-it would seem usually to permit a competitor,
supplier, or customer to bring suit on this kind of issue, while always
denying that right to the corporation itself or, it would seem, minority
directors.61
A rough dividing line seems to suggest itself. On one side are
single large transactions (such as mergers) Which must be judged by
general criteria of reasonableness or effect on competition and are
unlikely to result in demonstrable damages to potential treble damage
plaintiffs. On the other are continuing courses of conduct (such as
price-fixing) to which per se rules apply or which are very likely to
produce a multiplicity of treble damage claims. In the latter class of
cases, but not the former, shareholder intervention through derivative
suits seems defensible. By these standards the antitrust counts in
60 Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423 (1908) ; Graves v. Cambria
Steel Co., 298 Fed. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); De Koven v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry.,
216 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
61 See note 51 supra.
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Midvale and Ramsburg would seem to be excluded. Thus Midvale
was properly decided, although on unpersuasive reasoning, and the
Ransburg court, in being willing to proceed on the antitrust allegation,
was wrong. Because of the clear statutory criteria and simplicity of
proof, a section 8 count, as in Schechtman, might suitably be enter-
tained in a derivative action, although it is difficult to disagree with the
Second Circuit that a better showing of benefit to the corporation than
there made is needed for attorney's fees to be assessed against the
corporation. The large number of possible antitrust situations which
do not line up so neatly will, of course, present the courts with prob-
lems of judgment in balancing these and perhaps other factors in
ruling on motions to dismiss. But the policy of section 16 seems
clearly to call for the extension of preventive private antitrust actions
as far as may be consistent with sound judicial development of the
law. Congressional purpose should not be thwarted by statutory inter-
pretation which may unnecessarily and arbitrarily bar derivative suits
whose prosecution would be salutary. Neither should the door be
unnecessarily open to adventurers or capricious suitors. The ap-
propriate balance can best be achieved by decisions which take into
account and make explicit this statutory purpose in the light of all the
relevant factual circumstances.
III. ACTIONS To RECOVER FROM RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS
The final problem to be considered is that of the availability of
shareholders' derivative suits for recovery from officers and directors
of fines, forfeitures, damages, litigation expenses, and other costs to
the corporation resulting from activities which the management has
expressly or impliedly sanctioned and which have later been adjudged
in violation of the antitrust laws.'
Any liability which may arise in these circumstances stems from
common-law doctrines, not from the antitrust statutes as such. 13 If
the corporation's antitrust violation took the form of a conspiracy or
62 The obverse problem, in itself outside the scope of this discussion, is whether
a director can obtain reimbursement from the corporation for expenses incurred or
fines paid in an unsuccessful defense of an antitrust suit stemming entirely from his
acts on behalf of the corporation. This complex question has at least two major
branches: first, whether the director can obtain reimbursement as a matter of right
and second, whether the corporation can authorize reimbursement Both questions
are affected by statutory provisions in a number of major commercial states and the
latter, at any rate, may be affected by the presence of corporate charter or bylaw
provisions of different kinds. See generally Bishop, Current Status of Corporate
Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1956). The variety of
statutes is surveyed in Frampton, Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses,
23 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 325 (1958).
63 See generally STaEVNs, CORPORATIONS §§ 151-54 (2d ed. 1949). Of course, the
common-law right may be affected by a statute spelling out directors' duties. These,
however, are usually treated as codifications of traditional doctrines. See, e.g., N.Y.
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combination in which defendant directors have been proven to have
participated, the corporation's problems of proof may be easier," but
otherwise this fact should not be relevant. Indeed, for clarity of
analysis, we may assume for the following discussion that only-the
corporation has been found in violation of the antitrust laws and that
no antitrust allegation is made against any of the defendants in the
derivative action. Thus our hypothetical case may be found in a state
court or in a federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
The doctrinal starting point, of course, is that the directors of a
corporation are in some sense its agents for the purposes of carrying
on its affairs as provided in relevant statutes, charter, and bylaws. 65
As such, they owe to their principal a duty, in general terms, of acting
in good faith and using reasonable care in conducting its business, and
may be liable to it for losses caused by any breach of that duty. In
the kind of case here under discussion, no question as to the absence of
good faith arises; no conflict of interest or possibility of disloyalty or
malice is involved.66 The question is solely whether director action in
expressly or tacitly approving the illegal course of conduct, or failing
to prevent it, adds up to a failure of due care which has caused loss
or unnecessary expense to the company.
A. Standard of Care
Courts have not agreed in their attempts to define, even at only
a slightly lower level of generality, the content of the standard of
directors' care. Perhaps the most common formulation is that a
director-at least an "inside" director-is held to the same degree of
GEN. CORP. LAw § 60. An argument can be made that a corporation may recover
from its directors under § 4 of the Clayton Act, which makes a treble damage claim
available to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. . . ." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1958). The company's fines and other expenses or losses may be considered
as such injuries caused by the directors' illegal participation in the combination or
conspiracy. This could result in directors' liability nine times the damages proven by
the original injured party--certainly an unintended windfall for the corporation. But
§ 4 has been narrowly interpreted to exclude plaintiffs not in the "target area" of
the violation. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955)
(dictum) ; cf. note 50 supra. Thus, there is no substantial likelihood that this startling
result will be reached. Cf. Comment, 59 MIcH. L. RFv. 904, 912-29 (1961).
6 4 However, an adjudication in a Government suit or a treble damages action
that a director has been involved in an illegal activity is not res judicata in a later
suit on behalf of the corporation, nor will collateral estoppel necessarily apply. See
generally 1 MooPE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.401 (2d ed. Supp. 1960). Section 5 of the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1958), provides that a "final judg-
ment or decree" in an antitrust proceeding shall be "prima fade evidence . . . in
any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under
said laws." (Emphasis added.) However, the derivative action alleging breach of
duty to the corporation is not "under" the antitrust laws, so presumably section 5 is
not applicable. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
65 See STEvEws, CORPORATIONS § 143 (2d ed. 1949).
66 In this respect the cases to be discussed are unlike those dealt with in part I
of this Article, which typically involve director disloyalty, and similar to those dis-
cussed in part II, which do not,
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care in making decisions regarding corporate affairs as the "ordi-
narily prudent man in the conduct of his own affairs." " Some courts
and commentators have indicated that this is a more than usually
strict standard and that the appropriate criterion is "the diligent care
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circum-
stances in like positions." 11 A few jurisdictions still follow the
older and least exacting rule of liability only for gross negligence.0
All agree, however, that a director will not be held liable for "mere
errors of business judgment" when there has been no negligence, and
that there is a presumption of the regularity of director action."
Even if there were more general agreement upon a formulation,
however, such necessarily broad standards leave the trier of fact with
little guidance in specific situations. An attempt will be made here to
add some degree of specificity in a narrow antitrust context. The kind
of situation to be discussed is that in which the directors of a cor-
poration have thoroughly considered and, by their action or inaction,
sanctioned a course of corporate conduct which they know or should
know involves a substantial risk of antitrust violation. Discussion wil
not extend to the range of problems which arise when all of the di-
rectors are not aware of a questionable practice sanctioned by top
management, or when top management itself is incompletely informed
about activities at the operating level.7"
67 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (Supp. 1960), Scott v. Stanton
Heights Corp., 388 Pa. 628, 131 A.2d 113 (1957). Early New York cases show a
similar formulation. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237
(1918); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880) (dictum). But see Blaustein v. Pan
American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 304, 56 N.E.2d 705, 715 (1944):
"The law requires of directors that they shall exercise in good faith that care which
the problems confronting the corporation demand."
68 E.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1890); STEVENs, CORPORATIONS
§ 151, at 710 (2d ed. 1949); see Anderson v. Bandy, 161 Va. 1, 14-21, 171 S.E. 501,
505-08 (1933) (dictum).
69 E.g., Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 30, 197 N.E. 649, 667
(1935).
70 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRoRATIONS § 1039 (perm. ed. 1947) ; STEVENS, CoRPo-
RATIONS § 151, at 711-12 (2d ed. 1949). Interesting discussions of the origins of the
doctrines are to be found in Rhoads, Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate
Mis anagement, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 128 (1916), and Dwight, The Liability of Corpo-
rate Directors, 17 YALE L.J. 33 (1907). See also SPELLMAN, COPORATE DIacroRs
§207 (1931).
7 ' Thus excluded from discussion is the much debated but little litigated question
of the extent to which the role played by an individual director in corporate affairs
determines the standard of care in obtaining information to which he will be held.
Judicial implementation of standards in this situation cannot overlook the technological
fact that an industrial organization may become so immense and diverse in activity
as almost inevitably to develop such blockages of internal communication that the
top managerial group may in fact not be fully informed with respect to many im-
portant matters at the operating levels. However, appropriate treatment must also
consider the policy question whether effective social control of corporate acts de-
mands that those in whom ultimate authority reposes be held responsible for being
informed, without regard to actual knowledge or perhaps even traditional concepts
of negligence. See generally 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1032 (perm. ed.
1947); Note, A Defense of Non-Managing Directors, 5 U. CHm. L. REV. 668 (1938).
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1. Strict Liability
How does one analyze the problem of director liability in these
situations? The simplest and harshest approach, fortunately support-
able only by occasional loose dicta or by indefensible reasoning or
analogy, would be to hold directors strictly liable for concurring in
any acts later adjudged in violation of the antitrust statutes. The
argument for this position may take one of two forms. The first is
that a common-law rule of negligence per se applies when injuries
result from acts which are illegal, the statutory standards supplanting
or giving specific content to the more general standard of due care.72
Thus a motorist violating an ordinance against speeding will be held
liable for injuries caused by an accident, without the usual determina-
tion of negligence. This argument is weak not only in making use
of a doctrine which is increasingly disfavored, 73 but also, as applied to
antitrust violations, in failing to consider a crucial condition for the
doctrine to apply-that the injury must be within the class of injuries
which the statute was intended to prevent.74 The antitrust laws are
designed to prevent injuries to the competitive economy, not to pre-
vent the financial injuries which a corporation may suffer, in the form
of penalties, when its directors have led it into an antitrust violation.
Thus the doctrine is misapplied.
The second argument, closely related to ultra vires, is that the
directors act outside their authority whenever their direction causes
the corporation to act beyond the powers provided by statute or in
its charter. When there is no authority for their action-as when it
is illegal-ultimate liability must rest with them and not on the
corporation.7 5 This approach finds some support in the cases, but only
in limited situations quite removed from the antitrust context. 7 Thus,
if a statute contains detailed and unambiguous mandatory provisions
72 See, e.g., Cockrill v. Cooper, 86 Fed. 7, 12 (8th Cir. 1898) (federal banking
statute "creates a fixed standard . . . indicative of negligence . . .") ; Thompson
v. Greeley, 107 Mo. 577, 592, 17 S.W. 962, 966 (1891) ("every violation of law
is a breach of duty"). The doctrine of negligence per se in its general application
is discussed and criticized in 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS §§ 17.5, 17.6 (1956).
73 See 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 17.6, at 998-1011 (1956). Compare Morris,
The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 21 (1949);
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1913).
742 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 17.5, at 989-92 (1956).75 E.g., Southern Counties Thrift Co. v. Rairdon, 47 Cal. App. 2d 770, 118 P.2d
828 (Dist. Ct App. 1941); Sheldon v. Bills, 102 Neb. 93, 166 N.W. 117 (1918);
Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903) ; Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343,
118 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909); cf. Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S.
68 (1919) ; Seventeenth Ward Bank v. Smith, 51 App. Div. 259, 64 N.Y. Supp. 888
(1900).
76 The approach is thoroughly discredited as a means of avoiding corporate lia-
bility to injured outsiders, in part because it would place the corporation above respon-
sibility for tortious or other injurious acts by its agents. See, e.g., SvwNs, CoR-
PORATIONS § 63 (2d ed. 1949).
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with respect to the manner in which specific corporate affairs are to be
conducted, and the failure of directors to comply causes loss or injury,
liability may follow without an inquiry whether the act itself, apart
from the statute, was negligent.77  This result may be reached even
though there is no specific statutory provision for director responsi-
bility.78 The most common examples are laws regulating financial
institutions by prohibiting or limiting certain clearly defined classes of
loans or investments.79  Directors have been held liable without refer-
ence to negligence in a variety of circumstances in which they have
carried out corporate transactions in a manner not authorized by
statute, even where no self-dealing was evident.8" Perhaps the most
common cases are those in which dividends have been declared out of
capital.8 ' Likewise, when business is transacted beyond the scope of
the charter, directors may be held liable regardless of negligence in the
absence of acquiescence by shareholders."2 More recent opinions,
however, seem to place increasing emphasis on the directors' exercise
of "informed judgment." Perhaps more generally significant, de-
cisions are increasingly reflecting the view that director liability for
injurious acts beyond their statutory authority or "ultra vires" should
turn not upon the interpretation ultimately given the statute or charter
by the court, but upon the directors' exercise of due care in working
out the interpretation on which they acted. 4
77 E.g., Thompson v. Greeley, 107 Mo. 577, 17 S.W. 962 (1891) (statute limiting
amount of loans); Runcie v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 6 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup.
Ct. 1938) (statute limiting acceptability of fidelity bonds) ; Broderick v. Marcus, 152
Misc. 413, 272 N.Y. Supp. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (statute limiting amount of loans).7 8 E.g., Southern Counties Thrift Co. v. Rairdon, 47 Cal. App. 2d 770, 118 P.2d
828 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (industrial loan company statute); Van Schaick v. Carr,
170 Misc. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct 1938) (insurance law); Van Schaick v.
Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (insurance law). But cf.
Bramlette v. Joseph, 111 Miss. 379, 71 So. 643 (1916) (banking statute).
79 See cases cited notes 72, 77, 78 supra.
8 OE.g., Runcie v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 6 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct
1938) ; Walker v. Man, 142 Misc. 277, 253 N.Y. Supp. 458 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
81E.g., Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895
(1937); German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915);
Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd inern., 261 App. Div. 897,
26 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1941); Walker v. Man, supra note 80.
82 E.g., Fergus Falls Woolen Mills Co. v. Boyum, 136 Minn. 411, 162 N.W. 516
(1917) (charter imposed limit on corporation's debt) ; Holmes, Booth & Haydens v.
Willard, 125 N.Y. 75, 25 N.E. 1083 (1890) (charter authorized only metal manufac-
turing).
83 See, e.g., Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 33-35, 197 N.E. 649,
668-69 (1935) ("due care" in ascertaining earnings, though erroneous, protects from
liability for illegal dividends).
84 See Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956) (directors not liable after
careful but erroneous reading of income tax decisions and rulings); Harman v.
Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (directors not liable for interpretation of
charter limitation on use of "surplus property") ; Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9,
181 S.E. 897 (1935) (directors not liable to corporation on "ultra vires" contracts
where no failure of care) ; cf. Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, supra note 83, at 21-22,
197 N.E. at 662-63 (directors liable for "ultra vires" loss because of failure of care in
reading statute).
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To argue that in general these cases support a negligence per se
theory of director liability, seems unjustified. In most of those in
which liability was found, the court specifically noted that the statute
was so clear that its mandate could not have been misunderstood.
Thus any act implementing a violation was clearly either negligent and
a breach of the duty of due care or, worse, a willful act not to be im-
puted to the corporation. No one familiar with the antitrust laws need
be reminded that, unlike the detailed regulatory provisions involved in
these cases, the Sherman Act, at any rate, is of a "constitutional" gen-
erality, 5 Congress having chosen to defer to the courts in deciding
broad questions of applicability. Indeed, its proscription of "every
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade" and
"monopolizing" is among the broadest grants of judicial discretion to
be found in American legislation. The contrast in the nature of the
two types of statutes could hardly be greater. Thus these cases,
though large in number, seem to be of rather limited applicability to
antitrust situations.86
2. Business Judgment Approach
The approach at the opposite extreme would be to apply the
"business judgment" criterion to the possibility of antitrust penalties
in the same manner as to a business decision not involving possible
illegality. This argument requires elaboration. It starts with the
observation that American law recognizes the corporation as an im-
portant instrumentality for the organization of private ownership and
control of a wide range of business activity. Although in some senses
the corporation' is "owned" by its shareholders, its directors must
make all but a few extraordinary corporate decisions specified by
statute. In so doing, however, they have certain legal responsibilities
to the corporation, most of which are "negative" in nature: to re-
frain from willful or negligent waste of its assets or from diverting its
profits or seizing business opportunities, for example. But there is
85 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
86 Most of the cases imposing liability have arisen at the behest of banking or
insurance commissioners or trustees in bankruptcy seeking to accumulate a fund for
bondholders or creditors of bankrupt institutions. At least in these circumstances the
managers of such institutions may be held to a higher standard of caution as to
statutory implications than applies to the managers of business corporations generally.
Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880). Perhaps the most important common element
in these cases, however, is the basic notion that a corporation, as an artificial creature
of the state, has authority to act only as specifically authorized. Where statutes spell
out modes of carrying out fundamental corporate acts, directors purporting to sanction
nonconforming behavior are acting without authority. By contrast, it is exceedingly
difficult to find cases applying a strict liability approach to injuries to a business
corporation resulting from transgressions committed by it while engaged in activities
in the usual course of the business authorized generally by its charter's "purpose"
clause.
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a general affirmative responsibility recognized in law-and most cer-
tainly foremost in the minds of the business community-to manage
the corporation in the longrun best interest of its shareholders. In a
large company Whose stock is widely held, this obligation is primarily
to manage the business so as to make the company as profitable-and
thus as valuable-as ability permits, within the "rules of the game" set
by law. The antitrust laws often appear to be in head-on conflict with
this objective. In industries whose product demand is inelastic over a
substantial range of prices-and there are many-it may be possible
tb increase a firm's revenues enormously by following courses of
conduct prevented primarily by the threat of the antitrust laws. For
the corporation this threat takes the primary form of a risk of loss
from treble damage judgments, costs of litigation, and fines or
forfeitures, and a risk of restriction by a decree which limits corporate
activities 'or holdings. Evaluation of the degree of risk turns on the
probabilities of being detected and prosecuted and of succeeding in
court either on the law or the burden of establishing the facts, and on
the possible penalties, the extent of exposure to treble damage claims,
and related matters. If the usual "business judgment"-and no
other-criterion were applied, directors might freely decide to cause
the corporation intentionally to violate the law, so long as they take
into account the risks involved and find the anticipated profits worth
the gamble. No director liability to the corporation would exist if
the decision were made after due consideration and solely to advance
the interests of the corporation. Even a serious error in judgment in
balancing probabilities would produce no liability, so long as it did not
result from failure of due care in becoming informed and were not
so egregious that the decision could not have been honestly believed to
be in the best interests of the corporation.
B. Cases Involving Antitrust Violations
Neither of these extreme approaches has won the approval of the
courts in the very few cases involving antitrust violations.
Thus in Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co." a derivative suit was
brought against directors to recover fines and expenses-including fines
levied against defendant directors but paid by the corporation-arising
from the Madison Oil litigation!' Socony-Vacuum had been one of a
group of major midwestern oil companies indicted, along with many
of their directors, for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act in
87 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd inern., 267 App. Div.
890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
ssUnited States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Wis. 1938).
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participating in a combination and conspiracy for the purpose of raising-
or fixing prices of gasoline at the jobber, retailer, and "spot market"
levels. Their conviction in a jury trial was reversed by the court
of appeals " on the ground that the trial judge's charge to the jury
was based on the theory that such a combination was illegal per se.
The appellate court's view was that defendants' activities were not
unlawful unless they constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The Supreme Court, however, in a 5-to-2 decision, reinstated the
verdict." The major disagreement was whether the Court's decision
in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States91 had modified or created
an exception to the law with respect to horizontal price-fixing set
forth in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.92  Trenton Potteries
seemed to have clearly established that price agreements by members
of a combination controlling a substantial part of an industry were
illegal per se. However, in Appalachian Coals, decided in the depres-
sion year 1933, the Court refused to hold illegal an exclusive
selling agency entered into by bituminous coal producers in the
Appalachian region, though the arrangement, when put into effect,
would seem clearly to have curtailed price competition in a substantial
part of the industry. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion seems largely to
have based the decision on the unusually depressed economic condi-
tions in the industry and the presence of "destructive practices" which
the selling agency sought to "remedy." These are arguments, of
course, which would not have seemed to be available after Trenton
Potteries, but the opinion does not discuss that case. Even Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority in Madison Oil, seven years later,
fails persuasively to reconcile Appalachian Coals with either the formu-
lation of the per se rule which he undertakes or with Trenton Pot-
teries 93; indeed, the treatment of Appalachian Coals in later decisions
and by commentators seems to indicate that it is to be limited to its
own special facts.9"
But in 1934-36, when the directors of Socony-Vacuum were seek-
ing to find a solution to the depressed conditions in their industry-
which they doubtless had some reason to regard as nearly as critical as
that of the coal industry-this would hardly have been assumed. Fur-
thermore, their program of price stabilization seemed to have govern-
mental approval. It evolved in part from activities of the National Re-
89 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1939).
90 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
912&3 U.S. 344 (1933).
92273 U.S. 392 (1927).
93 See United States v. Socony-Vacuun Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 214-16 (1940).
94 See, e.g., Virginia Excelsior Mills v. F.T.C., 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958);
NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 41 (1960).
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covery Administration's Petroleum Administrative Board, whose head
had "authorized" the program's organizer to take such action con-
sistent with the NRA as was needed to restore markets to their
"normal" conditions. 5 However, as Justice Douglas' opinion points
out,9" no immunity from antitrust violation could be derived from
such informal administrative acts.
The holding of the New York court in the derivative suit not
only denied recovery of the corporation's fines and expenses, but sanc-
tioned payment by the corporation of fines imposed upon the
directors individually. The court said that the directors, in entering
into the illegal transactions, "acted honestly and reasonably and for
what they believed to be the best interests of the company"; " there
was no showing that they "acted fraudulently, negligently, or cor-
ruptly or in bad faith" or that "they knew, or had reason to believe,
that the buying program violated the Sherman Act. . . . [A] t most,
they made an honest and reasonable mistake or error of judgment or
of law." " Liability was denied because if directors act "in good faith
and exercise reasonable care . . . they are not liable for mistakes or
errors of judgment, either of law or of fact." " The court specifically
rejected the view that liability automatically resulted from illegal acts,
noting that the question turned on "the nature of the prohibited act-;
whether the statute is plain and unambiguous, and whether it contains
a limitation or restriction on the powers of the corporation or the
powers or duties of the directors themselves." 100 The opinion
specifically notes the disagreement among the courts and the Justices
as to the relevance of Appalachian Coals to the legality of the con-
demned buying program.1"' The court concludes:
It seems to follow that, as defendants did not knowingly
exceed their authority or the authority of the corporation, and
did not know or believe or have reason to believe that their
participation in the buying program was prohibited by the
Sherman Act, they cannot be held personally liable for dam-
ages. Nor can they be held personally liable for legal and
other expenses incurred by the defendant corporation in de-
fending the criminal prosecutions, even though the directors
were party defendants, and even though the defense was un-
successful, for the interests of the corporation were suffi-
ciently threatened by the prosecution to warrant the employ-
95 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 175-76 (1940).
96 Id. at 225-27.
9 7 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203, 38 N.Y.S.dt 270, 273
(Sup. Ct 1942), aff'd vinem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
98Id. at 203-04, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
99 Ibid.
100 Id. at 204, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
10 1 1d. at 203, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
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ment of counsel to defend it. . .. Neither can the defend-
ants be held personally liable because it paid the fines of the
defendants Arnott and Maguire on their plea of nolo con-
tendere . . . for, by that plea, a valuable consideration
moved from the defendants to the corporation, and the cor-
poration clearly benefited thereby."'
There have been few attempts since Simon to press corporate
claims against directors arising from antitrust situations-at least few
which have produced reported litigation. In Clayton v. Farish,°3 the
most important of these, derivative suits were brought- on behalf of
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) and certain subsidiaries against
its directors and I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G., alleging, inter alia, that
a conspiracy among the defendants resulted in a cartel agreement
which was designed to prevent Standard frbm entering into competi-
tion with I. G. Farben in the chemical business normal to Standard's
oil operations. It was alleged that the conspiracy and cartel agreement
violated the federal antitrust laws and that after a plea of guilty in
a Government prosecution Standard Oil had been made to enter into
a decree which provided for royalty-free licensing of certain of its
patents and processes and imposed fines. In addition to large allegedly
improper payments to I. G. Farben and profits allegedly lost, damages
were claimed for losses caused by the forfeiture of royalty rights re-
sulting from the decree and fines aggregating $35,000. Defendants
challenged jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied
the motion, affirming its jurisdiction to deal with a case properly
characterized as one sounding in breach of directors' duty. It based
its reasoning in part on the fact that Meyer v. Kansas City Southern
Railway L04 appeared to limit the availability of federal courts in
situations in which the violation of the antitrust laws also constituted
an act of director disloyalty. Discussing the losses to Standard Oil
alleged to result from the provisions of the decree, the court stated:
102 Id. at 205-06, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75. The same result as to reimbursement
of the fines paid by the directors would presumably not be reached today. The first
New York statute pertaining to indemnification and reimbursement became effective
on April 2, 1941, before the decision in this case but after the operative facts giving
rise to the derivative suit. There was no mention of the then recently enacted statute
in the opinion. The statute, as amended, however, has since been interpreted not to
authorize reimbursement of expenses flowing from criminal prosecutions under the
antitrust statutes. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113
N.E.2d 533 (1953). The decision has been widely criticized, commentators preferring
the analysis of Judge Fuld's dissent. See, e.g., Bishop, mipra note 62, at 1074-77.
Because the decision turns on interpretation of the statutory word "misconduct" it
is not directly relevant to the present discussion. See text accompanying notes 107-08
infra.
103 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
10484 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936). See note 45 *upra
and accompanying text.
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[L]iability cannot be imposed on defendants by this court
merely because they violated the Federal Antitrust Laws. The
basis of their liability here must be acts which fail to conform
to their fiduciary duty to Standard . . . . But once liability
has been established on that basis, the measure of damage is
the entire loss sustained by Standard, which should include
all damages or penalties paid by Standard to others as the
result of the self-same unlawful acts. 05
Thus, as in Simon, the court rejected any notion of strict liability. But
the approach was not at all the same. The opinion continues:
If defendants avoided competing with I. G. because they
wished to serve its interests in preference to those of Stand-
ard, that is a wrongful act for the consequences of which
they must answer to the corporation. If that wrongful act
has the additional vice of violating the Federal Antitrust
Laws as the result of which Standard is required to forfeit
its rights to royalties . . . or to pay damages or fines, those
losses to Standard are the direct result of defendants' acts
which this court may redress. . . . Of course, at the trial
plaintiffs will have to establish that this penalty in the anti-
trust decree was imposed because of those acts of defendants
which violated our law covering the duties of directors, and
not because of acts which violated only the Federal Anti-
trust Law.0 6
While the Simon court was concerned with whether the directors had
acted in good faith and exercised due care in charting the company's
course of action in the light of a risk of illegality, the Clayton v.
Farish rationale would hold the directors only if they were disloyal.
Thus, whereas the Simon rationale might find directors liable though
they are quite loyal to the company but fail to use due care to prevent
an illegal course of action, the Clayton court would seem to limit its
jurisdiction to situations in which the directors' action would be
grounds for liability even though no antitrust laws were on the books.
The importance of the difference is illustrated by a specific example.
If the course of conduct were that of entering into an illegal price-
fixing agreement with competitors, which increased the company's
revenues but later resulted in antitrust penalties, the Clayton rationale
would appear to deny a cause of action; there has been no act which
would be considered negligent or disloyal in the absence of antitrust
laws. The Simon court, on the other hand, might well find liability
for failure of care in unreasonably exposing the company to antitrust
105 Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 153-54, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727, 744-45 (Sup. Ct.
1947)06 Id. at 137, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
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risks. It is perhaps unprofitable, however, to press analysis of a trial
court's opinion much beyond the allegations with which it directly
deals. The Clayton decision is in accord with Simon in rejecting a
negligence per se approach, in not considering relevant the wide-open
"business judgment" approach, and in looking to general standards of
good faith and due care as decisive.
C. Other Cases
There is not a great deal of guidance to be derived from other
cases. Those on indemnification, 1 7 except for several of the earliest "o
decided on grounds which are not relevant to the present problem,
turn on interpretations of statutory language or charter or bylaw pro-
vislons. Conceivably, some analogical value might be found in cases
where the injury to the corporation stems not from an act made illegal
by statute but from liability for a tort or breach of contract negligently
or intentionally but unjustifiably authorized by directors.'0 9 But the
opinions are so very few and inadequate, in large part because the issue
is never squarely presented apart from other questions, as to be of
very limited usefulness.
D. Implications of the Cases
The persuasiveness of the approach of the Simon court, however,
allows us to pursue its implications further, at least in the many
situations in which the application of the antitrust laws is less than
perfectly clear. There is no doubt that when directors have exegrcised
reasonable care in evaluating a course of action that promises benefit
to a business corporation, they are justified in causing it to take busi-
ness risks of magnitudes which would not be appropriate to most
financial institutions or other fiduciary instrumentalities."10 Risk-
taking is of the essence of business ventures, expected and impliedly
107 See note 62 supra.
108 E.g., Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 288 Fed. 583 (W.D. Pa.
1923) Hoch v. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co., 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503
(1928i. Of course, Simn= involved indemnification as a subsidiary issue. See note
102 mipra.
109 Thus directors have been held liable in a derivative action for damages paid
by their company to the victim of a libel committed by them in the course of carrying
on the company's business. Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. 1, 98 N.E. 781 (1912). There
is at least a suggestion that a director might be liable to the corporation for negligently
causing it to breach a contract. Cf. J. E. Brulatour, Inc. v. Wilmer & Vincent Corp.,
63 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct 1946) (dictum).
110 This principle is most often expressed in the cases as a statement that the
standard of care is higher for directors of financial institutions. Note 86 m.pra. The
wide scope of the business judgment rule in circumstances where there is no bad
faith or self-dealing indicates the high degree of risk allocated to shareholders in busi-
ness corporations.
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agreed to by shareholders-and perhaps other corporate security
holders-as a means of securing profits not expected by the beneficiary
of a trust fund, for example.
That reasonable risks of antitrust liability are not outside the
normal scope of foreseeable business hazards seems clear from the
nature of antitrust regulation. It has often been pointed out that the
statutes constituting the antitrust laws are not entirely consistent in the
philosophies and methods of protection of competition which they
implement."1' An overly cautious view of their applicability might
foreclose to a company a considerable range of important and entirely
defensible methods of doing business, particularly in distribution. Thus
management may be failing properly to perform its function in some
cases if it fails to take some degree of antitrust risk."12 Even as to the
broader range of matters in which the statutes present no incon-
sistencies, the well-known breadth and generality of antitrust pro-
scriptions make it inevitable that even activity in the ordinary course
of business presents a quota of antitrust risks. Under these circum-
stances, it is not unreasonable to assume that shareholders anticipate
that over some range the possibility of antitrust litigation is a risk of
the enterprise, to be evaluated in the light of other circumstances in
accordance with usual standards of business judgment.
But it may be argued appealingly that corporate managers bear
responsibilities other than that of operating the company's business as
efficiently and profitably as they are able to do in the longrun interests
of the shareholders.113 The directors may be said in some sense to
act as trustees for employees, the community at large, or some other
group affected by the uses to which the corporation's power or pro-
ductive capacity is put. Thus they might be held to a higher standard
of caution with respect to antitrust violations-or other risks of il-
Ill See, e.g., Frankfurter, J., in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
74 (1953).
112 Modern cases are increasingly defining directors' duties to extend beyond the
traditional negative ones of not taking advantage of their "inside" position or being
grossly negligent See, e.g., Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N.Y.S.2d 172, 180 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
aff'd iner., 261 App. Div. 897, 26 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1942): "It was the duty of their
directors and officers to make every effort consonant with good, honest judgment
to obtain for those corporations as much . . . business as possible, and to make
this field of activity as profitable as it could be made"; Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc.,
239 N.C. 437, 443, 80 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1954): "It is the duty of the management of
a corporation to exercise good faith, care, and diligence, to make the property of the
corporation produce the largest possible amount . . . ." Although such expressions
of affirmative duties are becoming more common, the "business judgment!' rule will
almost always prevent liability from arising.
113 See, e.g., Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv.
L. REv. 1145 (1932). Compare Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees:
A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365 (1932). Professor Berle subsequently capitulated
to Professor Dodd's thesis. See BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST
REvoL oio 169 (1954). See also Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for the
Berkeley, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1955).
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legality-than would result from measuring their actions against rea-
sonable shareholder expectations. However, although courts have been
increasingly willing to support directors in their use of corporate funds
for public purposes only indirectly beneficial to the corporation,
11 4 there
has been no indication of a recognition in American jurisprudence of
a duty other than to the corporation and its security holders. Further-
more, an approach which placed upon directors legal responsibility for
advancing broader social objectives than those established and imple-
mented by legislatures and courts in effect would clothe them with the
mantle and discretion of legislators and judges, requiring them to
balance conflicting social values in a manner which neither their ex-
perience nor manner of selection justifies." 5  Thus it seems clear that
in the present state of the law the scope of directors' discretion at the
margins of social policy-where there exist risks of illegality-is prop-
erly defined by a duty to use due care and soundjudgment with respect
to the longrun interests of the company. The directors'I actions in
Simon clearly fall within this range, while those alleged in Clayton v.
Farish equally clearly do not, and the holdings in both cases are in
accord with this analysis.
On the other hand, in a situation to which per se illegality at-
taches or in which for other reasons a law violation is perfectly clear,
the present state of the law as to directors' responsibility, at least on
first examination, seems unambiguous. The scope of directors' dis-
cretion permitted by the "business judgment" rule, or any other
measure of directors' duty of care, appears to end at the borderline of
clear illegality."" The charter of the corporation constitutes an inter
sese contract among shareholders in which the, state is also to some
degree a party with interests it may enforce. The charter necessarily
incorporates, usually impliedly, the existing law bearing upon the
corporation's affairs. This body of law, as subsequently altered by the
legislature or courts in the exercise of the state's "reserve power," de-
fines the limit of the discretion which the shareholders may be assumed
to authorize the directors to exercise." 7  Shareholders cannot be
assumed to agree to bear the risk of director action which intentionally
or negligently places the corporation in violation of law. Such risks
are outside the scope of the venture as set by the charter. Therefore,
114 See generally STEVENS, CORPORATIOSs § 54 (2d ed. 1949).
115 See Katz, Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 75
(1960). See also Rostow, To Whom and for What End Is Corporate Management
Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 46, 64-69 (Mason ed. 1960).
116 See pp. 160-62 supra.
117 This analysis stems essentially from the Dartmouth College case, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), and provides the rationale as to director liability in, e.g.,
Southern Counties Thrift Co. v. Rairdon, 47 Cal. App. 2d 770, 118 P.2d 828 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941).
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directors who intentionally or negligently chart an illegal course for
the corporation act outside their delegated powers and at their own
risk.
The apparent certainty on this point is because it is founded on
a basic principle: that a person whose responsibility to act for others
deriVes from a legal relationship, rather than an entirely volitional one,
must be assumed to act within the rules of the system which provides
his authority. For such a creature of law as the "reasonably prudent
man"-the director-fiduciary, in this case-to be permitted to involve
others by acts contrary to law seems to entail an inconsistency so basic
as to threaten the intergrity of the legal system. Thus the courts, in
their role as guardian of that system, may find it imperative to insist
upon strict standards even in'situations in which the community might
be more lenient.
It may be urged, hiowever, that courts today are increasingly will-
ing to rule that a &fe~dant's intentional violation of law is only one
element to be considered in determining whether he should bear tort
liability."1 Thus the ordinary prudence of the law's "reasonable man"
may permit or even require action violating a statute. But in these
situations, the immediacy of danger of irreparable harm to the most
fundamental of values-life and limb or specific property-creates at
most a momentary privilege. So necessary an exception in no way
erodes confidence in the soundness of the legal rules or the integrity
of the system. Indeed, sound statutory interpretation may require
that action under these circumstances not be regarded as a violation
of law.119 But in business affairs, where the values threatened by
emergencies are at least a degree less fundamental and where predict-
ability and confidence in the rules are of the greatest importance, such
an interpretation is much less likely. It is perhaps possible, however,
to construct a hypothetical case which at least presents a question.
E. A Problem in Competing Values
Assume that a community has on its books an ordinance requiring
that all shops of a certain class remain closed on Saturdays. The only
penalty provided is a fine of $50 against the offending business for
each violation. The sole business of Company A is the operation of
shops which fall within the ordinance's classification. Competition has
become very intense and A's competitors have taken to remaining open
118 Cf. 2 HA2ER & JAmEs, TORTS § 17.6, at 1013-14 (1956).
119 The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code recognize "justification" of conduct
otherwise criminal in limited classes of special situations as a desirable general prin-
ciple of interpretation of the law of the offense. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 3.02 (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1958).
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on Saturday, in this way attracting enough of A's former clientele that
A's business can no longer be operated profitably. A's directors are
convinced that the business can be made profitable only by following
suit in competing for the rich Saturday market. They determine that
even if the maximum fines were regularly incurred, the margin would
be enough to assure profitable operations. Furthermore, to their
knowledge there have been no prosecutions under the ordinance. Then,
for the moment, let us add a finishing touch: the major shareholder is
a worthy charity whose income is primarily derived from the cor-
poration's dividends. On these highly "loaded" facts, even a purely
business purpose might be thought by most of the community to
justify intentional violation of the ordinance."0 Others, however,
would surely be deeply shocked at the suggestion. But even apart
from the interesting damages question," probably few would feel that
the director should be liable to the corporation for resulting fines.
Some might urge that the directors' duty to the corporation required
that they ignore the ordinance.
Before carrying the discussion further, a second hypothetical case
may be considered, different from the first only in that the ordinance
provides, in addition, that persons combining or conspiring to bring
about a violation are subject to criminal sanctions. Thus directors
as well as the corporation could be prosecuted-as is, of course, the
case with respect to many antitrust violations. Reflection on these
two cases yields some observations and tentative conclusions.
First, at least in the second hypothetical case, there are three
legal relationships which must be distinguished-the statutory man-
dates and penalties directed, first, to the corporation and, second, to
the director, and finally, the common-law duty of director to corpora-
tion. The latter need not in principle be coextensive with either of the
former, although it seems clear that in the second case there can be no
legal duty for a director to proceed at personal jeopardy to himself.
Probably there is no affirmative legal duty to proceed in the first case
either. The question is whether there is an inflexible duty not to
proceed.
120 The hypothetical case may be contrasted with Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc.
343, 118 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909), a suit in which recovery was sought from
an officer of an amount which he had paid out of corporate funds "to silence opposi-
tion" to the corporation's operating its amusement park on Sundays in violation of
the "Sunday laws" of the state. The payment was held to be an illegal expenditure,
rather than simply ultra vires, thus not subject to ratification, even, though the com-
plaining shareholder had acquiesced. One possibly important difference from the
suggested hypothetical case is that the act of payment, apparently a bribe to public
officials, was in itself, apart from staying open on Sundays, contrary to public policy.
121 Are there recoverable damages when the act resulting in a fine produces a
net profit to the company? Roth v. Robinson, supra note 119, allows recovery without
considering the problem. The question could be important, though doubtless embar-
rassing to the corporation, in the antitrust context.
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Second, regardless of community attitude, once a proceeding
against the company-and in the second case, the director-is brought
before the courts, its outcome is determined by the clear applicability
of an unambiguous statutory provision. It is to be noted, however, that
the community's decision whether and how to proceed permits great
flexibility, even where the violation is clear. The question is raised
whether the standard of duty of director to corporation should be less
subject to the moderating forces of community attitude than the
statutory provision which creates the liability. 2 '
Third, if there is to be a moderating force operating to protect
directors from liability to the corporation in this situation, it must be
introduced by admitting community attitudes into the standard of due
care. But it is to be noted that community consensus in such a
situation is a very fragile thing. For example, in the hypothetical
case, if the action had been taken not to save a failing business but to
make a highly lucrative establishment even more profitable, or if com-
petitors were not already ignoring the ordinance, or if the statutory
provision were of a different kind-a child labor regulation, for ex-
ample--any consensus might be lost. But these are factors which do
not usually enter into directors' business judgments. The directors'
obligation to the corporation would seem to be the same regardless of
who the owners are, for example, or whether the business is failing.
On the other hand, that the statute has in fact been unenforced, for
example, because the community would not tolerate prosecutions under
it, would seem to be a relevant factor for director consideration. There
are statutes on the books which are not "law" in any operative sense,
because they are abandoned as archaic or ill-considered, or because
they are expressions of a public morality with which no one expects
literal compliance. A later change of community attitudes giving new
vigor to such a statute (or judicial doctrine) might not be reasonably
foreseeable. Thus to some extent certain manifestations of community
attitude, at any rate, may be important in a director's evaluation of a
course of conduct, at least as a matter of practical business affairs.
Finally, the second hypothetical case presents a problem worth
additional consideration. Assuming that a "live" statutory provision
making a director personally liable will effectively eliminate any duty
he might otherwise have to the corporation to consider a course of
conduct, will it affect his possible liability to the corporation if he is
brash enough to persist in seeking to save the company? It might be
urged that fairness in this circumstance would prevent recovery-if the
22 For a discussion of this problem with respect to the negligence per se doc-
trine generally, see 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 17.6, at 998-99 (1956).
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director handsomely assumes a personal risk to further the cor-
poration's interests, it should not be heard to complain about his expos-
ing it to a similar risk. This argument finds some support in the
fact that a common measure of the director's duty is that he take the
same care with corporate affairs as he does with his own." On the
other hand, it may be urged that the director, freed of any possible duty
to act, is a "volunteer," traditionally unprotected by equitable doc-
trines.2 4 Most persuasive, however, is the argument that the addi-
tional personal sanction provides a strong warning that the community
attaches great importance to compliance and thus makes the director's
act more patently negligent towards the corporation.
As has been observed, if there is room for the courts to shield
directors from liability to the corporation in cases such as these, it
must come from a decision that the ordinarily prudent director will at
times appropriately make a judgment about the vitality of some "law-
on-the-books" as it bears upon a particular business situation. If re-
spect for the rule of law is to be preserved, it seems doubtful that judges
can ever explicitly permit the law's "norm" to evaluate, as a factor in
making an acceptable business judgment, the risk of getting caught in
a law violation. However, it can perhaps be recognized that if the
impact of a law is so arbitrary as to run counter to prevailing com-
munity values, a reasonable man might conduct his affairs-or those
of a corporation of which he is a director-on the assumption that it
will not be applied in a certain case. This will be particularly true
where-as in the hypothetical cases-the community's evaluation of
the "seriousness" of the offense is low.
F. Community Attitudes Toward the Antitrust Laws
The foregoing discussion is by no means intended to imply that
the antitrust laws, in particular or on the whole, fall into this category.
On the contrary, the adherence of Congress and the courts to their
objectives has been supplemented in recent years by apparently strong
legislative sentiment to strengthen them and by an increasingly vigor-
ous enforcement policy." 5 But it is equally clear that this attitude is
far from universal, particularly within the business community. In-
deed, the difficulty of the present problem stems in large part from that
fact. Many businessmen feel deeply that unmitigated competition is
I2 See note 67 supra.
124See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §2 (1936); SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY 112-14 (25th ed. Megarry & Baker 1960).
125 See, e.g., Bicks, Statement Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
July 20, 1959, on H.R. 7361 and H.R. 8126, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1959) ; Hansen,
The Administration of Federal Antitrust Laws, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 427 (1959);
Loevinger, Statement Before the A.B.A. Antitrust Section, April 7, 1961, TRADE REG.
REP. 2 (April 14, 1961).
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a needlessly destructive and generally unsatisfactory mode of doing
business.2 6 Some reputable economists join them in questioning the
soundness of antitrust as a tool of social control.117  In wartime and
other national emergencies, antitrust enforcement is more often than
not curtailed or suspended, presumably as too extravagant a luxury for
times of crisis. 2 8 A substantial part of the economy is protected by
regulatory agencies most of which appear to value competition only to
a very limited degree, at least in part because Congress has so
ordained. 2 9 Legal counsellors complain that it is difficult to give
useful and reliable advice on antitrust matters in part because of the
perverse behavior of the enforcement agencies and courts. 30 Some
may look the other way, or prepare opinions with cursory attention to
facts or precedent, on the apparent belief that one opinion is as good
as the next in the antitrust field. Finally, there exists a strong feeling
among businessmen that "everyone else is doing it" and that "it"
therefore cannot be illegal. 8'
If this is not completely a caricature of a widespread current view
of antitrust among businessmen and their advisers, it has troublesome
implications. If views of this nature are, or become, dominant in the
business community in which directors operate and from which they
are largely drawn, do they not inevitably become reflected in the
standard of the "ordinary prudent director" which measures the
duty of due care and business judgment? If the foregoing reading
of the law is correct, the attitude can hardly fail to be reflected in
courts' evaluation of how close to the brink of clear illegality directors
can permit their corporations to go. Even where illegality seems clear
to a dispassionate observer, directors and their counsellors may suc-
ceed in finding a ray of doubt in the cases and in the attitudes of en-
forcement agencies. But is it not "bootstrapping" to permit business-
men's perhaps less than impartial views on the meaning or vitality
of the antitrust laws to be reflected in the standard of duty which they
126 See, e.g., Cameron, Price-Fixers' Dilemma, 37 Harv. Bus. Bull., June 1961,
pp. 7, 9-10; Smith, What is the Businessman's Quarrel with the Antitrust Laws?,
1 ANTTRUST BULL. 261 (1955).
1 2 7 An interesting discussion and references will be found in Hennipman, Mmoop-
oly: Impediment or Stimulus to Economic Progress, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION
AND THEIR REGULATION 421 (Chamberlin ed. 1954). See Dewey, Mergers and
Cartels: Some Reservatiots About Policy, 51 Am. EcON. REv. 255 (1961).
128 Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies (pts. 1-2), 40 Mica. L. REv.
969, 1161 (1942).
129 See Levi, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Regulated Industries, 1959
ANTITRUST L. Sym. 136; von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries:
The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. REv. 929 (1954).
130 See, e.g., Van Cise, Problems and Procedures of Counsel in Advising on
Compliance with the Antitrust Laws, 5 ANTITRUST BULL.. 221 (1960). Compare Rashid,
What is Right with Antitrust?, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1960).
131 Cameron, supra note 126, at 8.
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owe their corporation and its shareholders? On the other hand, how
could this be avoided? No one would suggest that the appropriate
norm should be the "ordinarily prudent" judge, or lawyer, or
economist.
The dominant judgments of the business community do not, how-
ever, provide the sole content of the standard. Earlier analysis has
indicated that it is the reasonable expectations of the shareholders-
and perhaps other security holders-with respect to the risks the busi-
ness will be taking, which must define the ultimate limits of director
authority. In most corporations security holders may be assumed to
be a more representative cross section of the community at large than
are the managers. They are likely to retain a less specialized view of
the social utility and vitality of competition and the antitrust laws.
They may be expected to share with management an understanding
that the longrun interests of the company require suitably functioning
legal institutions, and that these, in turn, require community respect
for the rule of law. Free markets and private ownership of vast cor-
porate establishments can function only if all who participate in the
system can confidently assume that each will operate within the clearly
defined and effectively enforced rules of the game devised by legis-
latures and courts. Will courts hesitate to rule that it is not ordinary
prudence to expose shareholders to substantial risks of loss from actions
which run counter to such basic tenets? Even though the courts neces-
sarily and properly look to the business community to supply most of
the content of the formulations of directors' duties, the basic conception
of the charter as the ultimate source of corporate authority permits-
indeed, requires-that a broader view of public policy determine the
outer margins of director discretion."'
132 The suggested analysis presses beyond what the courts have had to work out
to decide the kinds of director liability cases which have so far come before them.
However, at least two fundamentally important cases bearing upon the limits of
directors' discretion provide perhaps some support. Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52,
74 N.E2d 305 (1947), was a derivative action seeking damages from directors who
acquiesced in management's plan, unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act,
to intimidate striking employees by dismantling plants and removing operations to
another locale. It was alleged that these acts were not within the scope of reasonable
business judgment but were done solely to carry out, at great cost to the company,
an antilabor campaign. Reversing a decision to grant a motion to dismiss, the court
of appeals held that the allegations constituted a cause of action. In Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), a program of withholding dividends
for purposes of expansion, increasing employment, and reducing auto prices (in the
face of existing demand greater than could foreseeably be supplied even at the higher
price) was held to be contrary to the reasonable expectations of shareholders, and
the company was required to declare a dividend rather than carry out the program.
In their broadest interpretations, these cases may mean that controlling directors are
not to be permitted to impose upon other shareholders their views of social organi-
zation or other values which, commendable or not, depart fundamentally from those
held by the community at large, upon which shareholders have a right to base their
expectations. Of the many discussions of these cases, the most useful is Comment, 15
U. CHI. L. REv. 423 (1948).
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G. Toward a Rationale
By way of summary and conclusion, what more specific guiding
standards. flow from the foregoing analysis? Are directors sufficiently
protected from possible crushing liability? Does this analysis provide
sufficient protection to the corporation and its shareholders and enough
bite to implement policy favoring antitrust compliance?
First, where there is no reasonable doubt as to the illegality of a
proposed course of conduct and it is clear that law-in-action does not
drastically depart from the law-on-the-books-as has in recent years
been the case with regard to per se offenses, intentionally predatory
acts, and conduct grossly impairing competition-authorization by
directors, either express or tacit, would seem to be at their own
risk.1 It is not a permissible exercise of business judgment to decide
that the risk of being detected or prosecuted is sufficiently small, or
exposure to treble damage liability sufficiently limited, that commercial
considerations outweigh them. Shareholders have not subscribed to a
gambling venture. Clear and unambiguous legal proscriptions provide
the minimum rules within which participants in the venture may be
presumed to share business risks and profits.
Beyond this relatively narrow range, the usual business judgment
rule should prevail. Certainly where there is little, if any, direct
precedent to indicate illegality at the time a course is set-as for
example, at present, simple, unadorned oligopoly pricing-a later de-
cision should not produce liability, even if the decision "demonstrates"
that its result has been the law all along."3 4 Where there is some close
precedent to indicate illegality, but other precedent, or well-reasoned
analysis, which rejects that outcome, the course of action should not
necessarily be foreclosed." 5 The same is the case in a situation where
a possible judicial or statutory basis for an argument of illegality has,
for sound reasons, never been pressed or has remained dormant for
a considerable period,'36 or even, in some circumstances, where the
FTC or Department of Justice has indicated its disapproval of a prac-
133 See pp. 170-71 supra.
'3
4 The cases seem uniformly to hold that directors' exercise of judgment should
be measured by the conditions at the time the decision was made, not with the benefit
of hindsight. See, e.g., Bailey v. Babcock, 241 Fed. 501, 514 (W.D. Pa. 1915);
Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 304, 56 N.E.2d
705, 715 (1944).
'35Reliance on opinion of independent counsel will usually suffice, although
directors are expected to use such opinion honestly and to review its analysis and
conclusions in the light of their own knowledge and experience. See, e.g., Spirt v.
Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Bailey v. Babcock, supra note 134, at 514; Blau-
stein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., supra note 134, at 299-300, 56 N.E.2d
at 713; Uffelman v. Boillin, 19 Tenn. App. 1, 40, 82 S.W.2d 545, 568 (1935). See
also Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 617, 625 (1949).
136An excellent example is the apparently definitive Supreme Court pronounce-
ment in Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), and FTC v. A. E.
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tice or proposed course of action, but where well-reasoned analysis in-
dicates that the courts are likely not to sustain that position. 8 More
generally, where there are reasonable and substantial grounds to be-
lieve that the legality of a practice can be sustained or that, for policy
reasons, it will not be challenged, directors should be free to use their
judgment. That this area of discretion should extend to all but clearly
determined matters is indicated by the legally recognized responsibility
of directors to maximize corporate profits by assuming reasonable
business risks. 8 This does not mean, of course, that shareholder
protection has terminated. Exercise of business judgment on a matter
of this sort will ordinarily require that one or more independent legal
opinions be obtained and independently evaluated by the directors,"3 9
that the anticipated advantage of the proposal be weighed against the
possible antitrust risks, that alternative courses of conduct be evaluated
in a similar manner and rejected, and that the final decision not be so
patently wrong as to constitute gross negligence. If these standards
have been met, however, there should be no director liability for mere
errors of judgment. 140
In addition to these conclusions, one general observation is sug-
gested by the foregoing analysis. Insofar as antitrust issues are
analyzed in terms of a rule of reason rather than on a more arbitrary
statutory or case law basis, potential director liability as a force for
antitrust compliance tends to diminish. In very few, if any, rule of
reason situations would a board of directors face any very serious risk
of liability in deciding to proceed, provided only that the question has
been given informed consideration. If directors are to risk the highly
burdensome sanction of financial redress to the corporation, it is up to
the courts and legislature to provide a higher degree of predictability
as to antitrust legality than has often been available in the past.
Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945), that price discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act includes sales producing different "mill net returns," an interpretation
which, though sought by the FTC, has since not been pressed with respect to common
current pricing practices. See discussion in ATT'y GEN. NATL COmm. ANTITRUST REP.
179-85, 209-21 (1955).
137 See note 135 supra.
138 See note 112 supra.
139 See note 135 mtpra.
140 See note 70 supra.
